Everything about Trope Philosophy totally explained
The term
trope is both a term which denotes figurative and metaphorical language and one which has been used in various technical senses. It comes from the
Greek τροπή (
tropē), "a turn, a change" and that from
τρέπω (
trepō), "to turn, to direct, to alter, to change". This means that the term is used metaphorically to denote, among other things, metaphorical language. Perhaps the term can be explained as meaning the same thing as
a turn of phrase in its original sense.
The term is also used in technical senses, which don't always correspond to its linguistic origin. Its meaning has to be judged from the context, some of which are given below.
Basic meaning as metaphor
Here a trope is a figurative and metaphorical use of a word or a phrase. The verb
to trope means then to make a trope.
In philosophy of history
The use of tropes has been extended from a linguistic usage to the field of
philosophy of history by, among other theorists,
Hayden White in his
Metahistory (1973). Tropes are generally understood to be styles of
discourse — rather than figures of style — underlying the historian's writing of history. They are historically determined in as much as the
historiography of every period is defined by a specific type of trope.
For
Hayden White, tropes historically unfolded in this sequence:
metaphor,
metonymy,
synecdoche, and finally,
irony.
Trope theory in philosophy (metaphysics)
Trope theory in metaphysics is a flavor of
nominalism. Here, a trope is a particular instance of a property, like the specific redness of a rose, or the specific nuance of green of a leaf. Trope theories assume that
universals are unnecessary. This use of the term goes back to
D. C. Williams (1953). The basic problem has been discussed previously in philosophy without using the term
trope. The following is a brief background:
The basic problem is the
problem of universals. One part of the problem of universals is determining what it's for two tokens (or separate instances of something) to be of the same type. How can different things be the same? The arguments are complex, and involve
semantics,
metaphysics and
epistemology. Part of the problem would be determining what it's for six different green objects to all be the same in respect to their color.
One classical solution is that of
realism as found in the middle period of
Plato's philosophy, with
The Republic as a crowning work. According to this solution there are
ideas or
forms for any property. These forms exist timelessly as singular, perfect individuals in a metaphysical (timeless, supra-sensible) world of their own. They correspond to what is later called
universals. Somehow the form of a specific color creates many secondary images of itself, as when a prototype is used to make copies or an object casts several shadows. Expressed more abstractly the individual colour-instances (the green of this leaf, the similar green of this frog) all partake in the same idea of green. In Plato the theory of
forms is related to his theses about
innate knowledge. In
Phaedo the turn of the argument is that we can't learn from experience what similarity is through
abstraction, but must possess it in an innate form before we've any experience (Phaedo 74a-75d).
Nevertheless Plato in the
Parmenides dialogue himself formulated several problems for his view. One is: How can the idea, being single, nevertheless be present in a multitude of separate instances without being split apart.
The other solution is that of
nominalism. Here the thesis that universals such as the
ideas or
forms of
Plato are unnecessary in an explanation of language, thought and the world. Only single individuals are real, but they can be grouped together by a human observer through their similarities. Nominalists are usually
empiricists.
Berkeley, for example, argued against
universals or
abstract objects using nominalistic arguments. He used the term
idea to denote specific perceptions of an atomistic nature. They could be grouped through similarities or one could take a specific instance, for example the green hue of this frog one is looking at now, as a kind of paradigm case or prototype, and regard everything that was similar to it as belonging to the same type or category. One attraction of the nominalistic program is that if it can be carried out it solves Plato's problem in
Parmenides, since the need for a single idea or form or universal
green then vanishes and it can be expunged through
Occam's razor, for example the rule that one should always prefer the simplest theory or account of anything.
In
Problems of Philosophy (1912, chapter IX)
Bertrand Russell argued against Berkeley and took the same basic position as Plato. His argument was basically one against any form of
nominalism. It says, briefly, that if we introduce several instances of green as separate individuals, we nevertheless have to accept that the reason that we group them together is because they're similar. Therefore we must presume at least one true universal, that of similarity.
Two popular recent solutions to the problem of universals, as it relates to the possibility of entities existing in multiple locations at the same time, are as follows.
David Armstrong, a well known Australian philosopher, argues, like Russell and the middle Plato, that there are instantiated universals. Briefly, an instantiated universal is a property (such as being green) that can exist in multiple locations at the same time. Going back to the problem of universals, for six different objects to all be green would be for each object to instantiate the universal green. The very same, identical universal green would be wholly located at each green object. To be even more specific, if a frog and a leaf are the same shade of green, the green of the frog and the green of the leaf are one and the same entity, which happens to be multiply located.
Keith Campbell and
Michael LaBossiere, among others, reject instantiated universals in favor of tropes. Briefly, a trope is a property (such as being green) that can only exist in one location at one time. Trope theorists explain what it's for two tokens (individual instances) to be of the same type in terms of resemblance. As an example, for six different objects to all be green would be for each object to have its own distinct green trope. Each green trope would be a different entity from the other green tropes, but they'd resemble each other and would all be taken to be green because of their resemblance.
Further Information
Get more info on 'Trope Philosophy'.
|
External Link Exchanges
Do you know how hard it is to get a link from a large encyclopaedia? Well we're different and will prove it. To get a link from us just add the following HTML to your site on a relevant page:
<a href="http://trope__philosophy.totallyexplained.com">Trope (philosophy) Totally Explained</a>
Then simply click through this link from your web page. Our crawlers will verify your link, extract the title of your web page and instantly add a link back to it. If you like you can remove the words Totally Explained and embed the link in article text.
As long as your link remains in place, we'll keep our link to you right here. Please play fair - our crawlers are watching. Your site must be closely related to this one's topic. Any kind of spamming, dubious practises or removing the link will result in your link from us being dropped and, potentially, your whole site being banned. |
